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East Asia in World Trade:   
The Decoupling Fallacy, Crisis, and Policy Challenges 
 
The ‘decoupling’ thesis, the notion that the East Asian region has become a self-contained 
economic entity with potential for maintaining its own growth dynamism independent of 
the economic outlook for the traditional developed market economies, was a popular 
theme in Asian policy circles in the first decade of the new millennium until the onset of 
the recent financial crisis.
1
The global financial crisis  (GFC)  has served to reveal the fragility of the 
decoupling thesis since all major East Asian countries, including China, have experienced 
precipitous trade contractions. Consequently, the policy debate in East Asia has made a 
U-turn from the complacency of the decoupling thesis to call for the rebalancing of East 
Asian growth with a view to reducing its susceptibility to the vicissitudes of the global 
business cycle (ADB 2010, IMF 2010). 
  The empirical basis for this was provided by studies of trade 
patterns based on readily available trade data, which revealed a continuous increase in 
trade among the countries in the region (intra-regional trade) since the late 1980s, a 
process which received added impetus from the subsequent emergence of China as a 
world export powerhouse. A few studies questioned the validity of this inference in a 
context where international production fragmentation and the related network trade had 
been rapidly expanding with East Asia as  its centre of gravity (Roach 2009:  Ch. 1; 
Bergsten et al. 2006, Athukorala 2005, Garnaut 2003).  However, the decoupling thesis 
continued to dominate the policy scene, presumably because it fitted well with the East 
Asian growth euphoria of the day.    
What went wrong with the decoupling thesis?  Was the trade integration story that 
underpinned the decoupling thesis simply a statistical artifact, resulting from a failure to 
incorporate  the  realities  of  an era of global production sharing? What are the policy 
challenges faced by the East Asian economies in the post-GFC era? Is there room for an 
integrated policy response that marks a clear departure from the pre-crisis policy stance 
favouring outward-oriented development strategies?  This chapter aims to probe these 
                                                  
1 See Urata (2006), Yoshitomi (2007) and Park and Shin (2009) and the works cited therein.   
 
2 
and related issues through a comparative analysis of the export experiences of China and 
other  East Asian  economies  in the aftermath of the crisis against the backdrop of a 
systematic analysis of pre-crisis trade patterns.  
The decoupling thesis is based on the traditional notion of horizontal specialisation 
according to which international trade is an exchange of goods that are produced from 
start to finish in just one country.  It ignores the implications for trade flow analysis of the 
ongoing process of global production sharing
2
 First, in the presence of global production sharing, trade data are double-counted 
because goods in process cross multiple international borders before becoming embodied 
in the final product.  Thus, the total amount of recorded trade could be a multiple of the 
value of final goods.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, trade shares calculated 
using reported data can lead to wrong inferences as to the relative importance of the 
‘region’ and the rest of the world for the growth dynamism of a given country, even 
controlling for double counting in trade. This is because ‘fragmentation trade’ and trade 
in related final goods (‘final trade’) are unlikely to follow the same patterns.  Third, the 
intra-regional trade ratio estimated by lumping imports  and  exports tends to hide a 
significant asymmetry in regional trade patterns of imports and exports in a context where 
network related trade is growing rapidly. 
 the breakup of the production processes 
into separated stages, with each country  specializing  in a particular stage of the 
production sequence and the increasingly important role played by China and other 
East Asian countries in the resultant global production network. In a context where 
production-sharing based trade is growing rapidly,  trade flow analysis based on the 
assumption of horizontal specialisation can lead to misleading inferences about the nature 
and extent of trade integration among countries for three reasons. 
Given these concerns, a meaningful analysis of trade patterns requires systematic 
separation of parts and components (henceforth referred to as ‘components’ for short) 
from final (assembled) products in reported trade data. We do this through a careful 
disaggregation of trade data based on the Revision 3 of the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC, Rev 3) extracted from the United Nations trade data  reporting 
                                                  
2.  In the recent literature,  an array of alternative terms have been used to describe this 
phenomenon, including ‘international production fragmentation’, ‘vertical specialisation’, ‘slicing 
the value chain’ and ‘outsourcing’.  
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system (UN Comtrade database).
3
For the purpose of this paper, East Asia (EA) is defined to include Japan and 
developing East Asia (DEA), which covers the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) of 
North Asia (South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong), China and members of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Among the ASEAN countries, 
Myanmar is not covered because of a lack of data and Brunei, Cambodia and Laos are 
treated as a residual group because of data gaps. The East Asian experience is examined 
in the wider global context, focusing specifically on the comparative experiences of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU). 
    
The paper is structured as follows.  The first section examines trade patterns in 
East Asia in the global context, paying attention to the nature and extent of production 
sharing and network-based trade, East Asia’s role in this new form of international 
exchange and its implications for regional versus global economic integration.  In the 
next section the latest available data are used to examine the impact of the GFC on the 
export performance of East Asian economies.  The following section deals with post-
crisis policy challenges, focusing on the emerging debate regarding  rebalancing (or 
reshaping) development strategies. The final section summarises the key findings and 
draws some general inferences. 
   
Pre-crisis Trade patterns 
Rapid export growth has been the hallmark of East Asia’s rise in the global economy. The 
combined share of East Asian countries in world non-oil exports recorded a three-fold 
increase between 1969/70 and 2006/7  from  11  percent  to 33  percent.
4
                                                  
3 For details on the decomposition procedure, and the list of parts and components used in the 
analysis, see Athukorala (2009c). 
  The region 
accounted for over 40 percent of the total increment in world exports over this period.  In 
the 1970s and 1980s, Japan dominated the region’s trade, accounting for nearly 60 
percent of its exports and imports. The picture has changed dramatically over the past two 
4 Trade magnitudes throughout the paper are measured in current US dollars unless otherwise 
indicated. Inter-temporal comparison calculations are made for the two-year averages relating to 
the end points of the period under study, so as to reduce the impact of year to year fluctuations of 
trade flows.  All data reported, unless otherwise stated, are compiled from the UN Comtrade 
database.  
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decades with the share of developing East Asian countries increasing rapidly in the face 
of a relative decline is Japan’s position in world trade. By the middle of this decade these 
countries accounted for over 80 percent of total regional trade. The rise of China has been 
the dominant factor behind this structural shift,
5
Rapid export growth in East Asia has been underpinned by a pronounced shift in 
the region’s export structure away from primary commodities and toward manufacturing.  
By 2005/7 manufacturing accounted for 92 percent of total exports from Asia, up from 78 
percent  four decades ago. Within manufacturing, machinery and transport equipment 
(SITC 7), particularly information and communication technology (ICT) products and 
electrical goods, have played a pivotal role in this structural shift.  The share of Asia in 
world machinery and transport equipment exports increased from 14.5 percent in 1994/5 
to 42.4 percent in 2006/7, with DEA accounting for over four-fifths of the increment.  By 
2006/7, over 58 percent of total world ICT exports originated from Asia, with China 
alone accounting for 23 percent (Table 1).  In electrical goods, China’s world market 
share increased from 3.1  percent  to 20.6  percent  between these two years. Export 
dynamism in these product lines has been driven by the ongoing process of global 
production sharing and the increasingly deep integration of East Asian countries into 
global production networks. 
 but the other countries in the region 
(Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, and more recently 
Vietnam) have also increased their world market shares. 
 
Table 1 about here 
Table 2 about here 
 
The best available indicator of the intensity of global production sharing is the 
share of parts and components in total manufacturing trade.
6
                                                  
5  For details on China’s rise as a major trading nations and its implications for the other countries 
in the region, see (Athukorala 2009a  and 2009b ) 
  Reflecting the rapid growth 
of global production sharing, the share of components in manufacturing trade has sharply 
increased across all major countries in the region (Table 2). In 2006/7  components 
6  Henceforth, for the sake of brevity, we use the term ‘components’ in place of ‘parts and 
components’.  
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accounted for 34.1  percent  of East Asia manufacturing exports (42.1  percent  of 
manufacturing imports) compared to a world average of 27.1 percent (27.3 percent of 
imports).  The share of components is particularly high among the ASEAN countries. 
There is a remarkable similarity in component share figures in both exports and imports 
across countries, reflecting overlapping specialisation patterns in component assembly 
among countries in the region. 
The rapid increase in the component intensity (percentage shares of parts and 
components) in East Asian trade is closely associated with cross-border component trade 
within regional production networks.  As can be seen in Table 3, components account for 
a much larger share in intra-regional trade in East Asia compared to these countries’ 
shares of world trade and trade with EU and NAFTA. Moreover, the share of components 
in total intra-regional imports is much larger than in exports, and has increased at a faster 
rate.  This reflects the fact that the region relies more on the rest of the world as a market 
for final goods than as a market for components. Within East Asia, ASEAN countries 
stand out for the high share of components in their intra-regional trade flows (over 60 
percent  in 2006/7). According to country-level data, the share of components in 
manufacturing exports and imports amounted to over four-fifths in Singapore, Malaysia 
and the Philippines and over two-thirds in Thailand. South Korea and Taiwan are also 
involved in sizeable trade in components with other countries in the region.  In 20067 
components accounted for 59.2  percent  and 74  percent  of China’s imports from 
developing Asia and ASEAN countries compared to 44 percent in total imports. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
China in East Asia Trade 
Manufacturing products dominate China-East Asian trade flows, accounting for nearly 90 
percent of both imports and exports (Table 4).  In China’s total manufacturing imports 
from East Asia, the share of components increased from 18 percent in 1994/5 to over 44 
percent in 2006/7. Within manufacturing, the  share  of  components  is much larger in 
machinery and transport equipment imports, at nearly three-quarters  in 2006/7.  The 
shares of components in manufacturing exports also have increased over the years, but  
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the magnitudes are significantly lower compared to those in total imports.  Interestingly, 
although China’s importance as a market for the rest of East Asia has increased during the 
period under study (see below), the importance of the region for China’s export 
expansion has declined notably, as it only absorbed 33.7 percent of China’s total 
merchandise exports in 2006/7, down from 55.8 percent in 1993.   East Asia’s share in 
China’s total imports increased marginally from 21.3 percent in 1992/3 to 28.8 percent in 
2006/7.  
 
Table 4 about here 
Table 5 about here 
 
Table 5 summarises data on China-East Asian trade relations at the individual 
country level. Data on the geographic profile of China’s manufacturing imports from the 
region are in Panel A.  Panel B gives data on the relative importance of China as an 
export destination of the East Asia economies. Nearly 60 percent of China’s 
manufacturing imports originate in East Asia. The bulk of these imports come  from 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan. The share of imports coming from the other East Asian 
countries is small, although growing fast.  In 2007 China accounted for only 21.2 percent 
of total manufacturing exports from the rest of East Asia.  At the individual country level, 
China accounted for 33 percent and 27 percent of exports from Taiwan and Korea 
respectively.  China was also one of the most important export destinations of the 
Philippines, accounting for more than one fifth of total exports. For all other ASEAN 
countries, the figures are much smaller, varying from 8 percent to 13.5 percent.  Clearly, 
aggregate data hide some significant differences among East Asian countries in trade 
links with China, with China’s intra-regional trade being largely concentrated in trade 
with Japan, Korea and Taiwan. 
 
 
Intra-regional trade patterns 
The previous section reveals three important features of the emerging trade patterns in 
East Asia compared to overall patterns of global trade. First, component trade has played 
a more important role in trade expansion in East Asia. Second, trade in components  
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accounts for a much larger share in intra-regional trade than is the case for the rest of the 
world.  Third, China’s rapid trade expansion largely reflects its role as an assembly centre 
within global production networks; China’s trade links with the rest of East Asia are 
dominated  by components for assembling  final products which are predominantly 
destined for markets in the rest of the world. Given these three peculiarities, conventional 
trade-flow analysis is bound to yield a misleading picture as to the relative importance of 
intra-regional trade, as compared to global trade, for growth in East Asia. 
To illustrate this point, intra-regional trade shares are estimated separately for 
total manufacturing, components, and final goods (total manufacturing net of 
components), and reported in Table 6.  The table covers trade in East Asia and three sub-
regions therein which relate to contemporary Asian policy debates  on regional 
integration. Data for NAFTA and EU are reported for comparative purposes. Estimates 
are given for total trade (imports + exports) as well as for exports and imports separately 
in order to illustrate possible asymmetries in trade patterns resulting from East Asia’s 
increased engagement in fragmentation-based international exchange.
7
 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
Trade patterns depicted by the unadjusted (standard) trade data affirm the 
perception underlying the decoupling thesis that Asia, and in particular East Asia, has 
become increasingly integrated through merchandise trade.  In 2006/7 intra-regional trade 
accounted for 55.1 percent of total manufacturing trade, up from 35.8 percent in 1986/7. 
The level of intra-regional trade in East Asia was higher than that of NAFTA throughout 
this period and was rapidly approaching the level of the EU-15.  For developing East 
Asia (Asia excluding Japan) and ASEAN +3, the ratios are lower than the aggregate 
regional figure, but they have increased at a much faster rate.  The intra-regional trade 
share of ASEAN has been much lower compared to the other two sub-regions.  
However the picture changes significantly when components are netted out: the 
intra East Asian share in final trade in 2006/7 was 46.4, down from 50.3 percent in 
                                                  
7   Disaggregated data needed for separating parts and components from total (reported) trade are 
available only from 1992 (Athukorala 2009b).   
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1992/3.  The estimates based on unadjusted data and data on final trade are vastly 
different for East Asia, particularly for DEA and ASEAN. Both the level of trade in the 
two given years and the change over time in intra-regional trade shares are significantly 
lower for estimates based on final trade. Interestingly, we do not observe such a 
difference in estimates for NAFTA and EU. 
The intra-regional shares calculated separately for imports and exports clearly 
illustrate the risk of making inferences about regional trade integration based on total 
(imports + exports) data. There is a notable asymmetry in the degree of regional trade 
integration in East Asia.  Unlike in the EU and NAFTA, in East Asia the increase over 
time in the intraregional trade ratio (both measured using unadjusted data and data for 
final trade) has emanated largely from the rapid increase in intra-regional imports; the 
expansion in intra-regional exports has been consistently slower.  The dependence of East 
Asia (and country sub-groups therein) on extra-regional markets (in particular those in 
NAFTA and EU) for export-led growth is far greater than is revealed by the standard 
intra-regional trade ratios commonly used in the debate on regional economic integration.  
For instance, in 2007 only 43.9 percent of total East Asian manufacturing exports was 
absorbed within the region, compared to an intra-regional share of 64.4 percent in total 
manufacturing imports.  For DEA the comparable figures were 33.4 percent and 46.7 
percent respectively.  This asymmetry is clearly seen across all sub-regions within East 
Asia.  The asymmetry between intra-regional  shares of import and exports is much 
sharper when components are netted out. This is understandable given the heavy 
‘component bias’ in Asian intra-regional trade and the multiple border-crossing of parts 
and components within regional production networks.  On the export side, the intra-
regional share of final goods declined continuously from 46 percent in 1995 to 37 percent 
in 2007, whereas intra-regional import share increased from 56 percent to 63 percent 
between these two time points. 
In sum, these data support the hypothesis that, in a context where global 
production sharing is expanding rapidly, standard trade flow analysis can generate 
misleading inferences regarding the process of economic integration through trade. When 
data on assembly trade are excluded from trade flows, these estimates suggest that extra-
regional trade is much more important than intra-regional trade for continued growth in  
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East Asia, whether or not Japan is included. Thus the rising importance of product 
fragmentation seems to have strengthened, rather than weakened, East Asia’s link with 
the wider global economy.  As we will see in the next section, this inference is basically 
consistent with the behavior of trade flows in East Asia following the onset of the GFC. 
 
Trade performance in the aftermath of the crisis 
 
A striking feature of the global economy following the onset of the in late 2007  GFC has 
been the precipitous drop in global trade at a faster rate than during the Great Depression 
(Almunia et al. 2010, Krugman 2009). From April 2008 to June 2009 world trade 
contracted by about 20 percent which amounted to almost the total contraction in world 
trade during the first thirty months of the Great Depression (starting in April 1929).
8
 
  
Interestingly, the trade contraction experienced by the East Asian countries during this 
period has been even greater than the contraction in total world trade (Figure 1, Table 7).   
Figure 1 about here 
Table 7 about here 
 
Krugman (2009) points to the increased vertical integration of global production 
(the rise of globe production sharing) as a possible explanation for the surprisingly large 
trade contraction  in the present crisis compared to the Great Depression. Vertical 
integration of production implies that a given degree of contraction in demand for a final 
(assembled) product has ramifications over trade flows between  the  many countries 
involved in the production chain.  Also, demand for components is susceptible to rapid 
stock adjustment by producers compared to final goods. Given that global production 
sharing is much more important for trade expansion in East Asia, this explanation also 
seems relevant for East Asia’s greater trade contraction compared to overall trade 
contraction at the global level. However, a number of other factors are also relevant for 
explaining the larger contraction in trade volume in the current crisis. These include the 
                                                  
8 Numbers derived from Figure 5 in Almunia et al. (2010).   
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much larger contraction of trade credit, a greater share of consumer durables in 
contemporary world trade compared to the 1930s, and the effect of recent advances in 
communication technology on inventory cycle and just-in-time procurement practices. 
The current state of data availability does not permit us to systematically delineate the 
impact of production sharing on trade contraction while appropriately controlling for 
these other possible factors. Instead, this section puts together some readily available data 
that have some bearing on this issue in order to set the stage for further analysis. 
All major East Asian countries (including China which was expected by the 
decoupling enthusiast to cushion the rest of East Asia against a global economic collapse) 
experienced a precipitous trade contraction from about the last quarter of 2008 (Table 7). 
The remarkably synchronized  nature of the trade contraction across countries in the 
region, both in  imports  and exports, is generally consistent with the  close trade ties 
among the East Asian countries forged within regional production networks and  the 
unique role of the region within global production networks.  
   Among the East Asian countries Japan has been by far the worst hit.  A large share 
of Japan’s exports consists of capital goods and high-end durable consumer goods, such 
as cars and electrical machinery, machine tools and their components. Exports of capital 
goods and high-end consumer durables are heavily concentrated in the US and other 
developed-country markets and are therefore directly exposed to the global economic 
decline. On the other hand, contrary to the predictions of the decoupling enthusiasts, 
Japan’s growing exports to China have been indirectly affected by declining  final 
(assembled) exports from China (Fukao and Yuan 2009). The degree of export 
contraction suffered by Taiwan and Korea has been smaller compared to Japan but, on 
average, notably higher compared to the other East Asian countries. As in the case of 
Japan, growing exports to China do not seem to have provided a cushion against collapse 
in world demand for these two countries. The relatively lower degree of export 
contractions experienced by Korea, Taiwan and the second-tier exporting countries in the 
region compared to Japan could possibly reflect consumer preferences  for  price-
competitive low-end products in the crisis context. 
An inspection of growth rates of exports of individual East Asian countries by 
destination provides no support for the view that East Asian economies have become less  
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susceptible to the world-wide trade contraction because of regional growth dynamism.
 9
Exports to China from most countries in the region have contracted at a much 
faster rate compared to their imports from China, perhaps an indication of destocking of 
components by Chinese firms given the gloomy outlook for exports (Table 8).  China’s 
imports from Japan, Korea and Taiwan have shrunk more rapidly (at an average rate of 
23.5  percent) than imports from other countries. This is not surprising, given the 
dominant role played by the former countries in the supply of components to ICT 
assembly activities in China which are heavily exposed to contractions in import demand 
in the USA and other developed countries.  Overall China’s imports from countries in the 
region  intra-regional imports have contracted at a much faster rate compared to her 
imports from the USA and EU.   
 
Intra-East Asia trade flows have in general contracted at a faster rate compared to these 
countries exports to the USA and EU.   
   
 
Table 8 about here 
Table 9 about here 
   
Date on export growth by major commodity category for import and export of 
China are summarised in Table 9.   A notable pattern is the relatively sharper contraction 
in the category of machinery exports (in which network trade is heavily concentrated) 
compared to other product categories, in particular traditional labour-intensive products 
(textile and garments, footwear and other miscellaneous manufactures). Exports 
belonging to this commodity category, in particular ICT products and consumer 
electronics are also  predominantly consumer  durables which, as already noted,  are 
generally more susceptible to income contraction. In traditional labour-intensive 
products, developing country producers have the ability to perform better purely on the 
basis of cost competitiveness even in a context of depressed demand.   
 
                                                  
9  This inference is based on monthly exports data extracted from the CIEM database (not 
reported here for want of space).   
 
12 
 
Policy options 
 
At the time of writing this paper (mid June 2010) ‘the global recovery is proceeding 
better than expected’ (IMF 2010, p. 1). Industrial production in the United State and other 
major developed countries has begun to recover and the downward spiral in world trade 
volume has abated. However the economic forces unleashed by the crisis will probably 
run rampant for years. The recovery has so far been driven largely by unprecedented 
fiscal and monetary stimulus and there is considerable downside risk of sustainability 
stemming from fiscal fragility.  Over the medium term the US and other crisis affected 
developed countries will have to save more and spend less in order to wind down the 
massive accumulated household and public debts.  Given this global economic outlook, 
what are the policy options available to governments in China and other East Asian 
countries which have depended largely on exports driven growth?   
There has been a growing emphasis in Asian policy circles on the need for 
rebalancing growth  engineering a structural shift in aggregate demand away from 
exports and towards domestic markets  (ADB 2010). The policy measures under 
consideration include measures to redress the export bias in the incentive structure, to 
reduce high saving propensities with a view to boosting domestic consumer demand and 
other measured directly aimed at promoting domestic non-tradable (services) production.  
The major focus of this policy advocacy is on China.    
China’s degree of export dependence is unusually high for a continental economy 
of China’s size. China’s export to GDP ratio (around 40 percent) grossly exaggerates its 
export dependence because of the heavy import dependence of assembly exports which 
accounts for over two thirds of total merchandise exports. However, even the available 
adjusted estimates (around 20 percent) seem too high for China’s potential economic size.    
Moreover the unusually high domestic saving rates, the vast population base, highly 
repressed domestic financial system, excessively high (massive) urban-rural household 
income gap, all indicate the vast potential for policy-induced  domestic  demand-led 
growth in China.  Growth rebalancing will not only enable China to deal effectively with 
massive external imbalances  while cushioning growth momentum against external  
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demand shocks, but also to engineer a critical shift in the focus of national development 
policy from the quantity to the quality of growth, with a view to redressing urban-rural 
disparities and achieving social harmony.   
The  need for embarking on a major structural transition from export-led to 
domestic-demand led growth was recognized by the Chinese leadership the well before 
the onset of the global financial crisis (Roach 2009, 229-233).  The 11
th Five-Year Plan 
enacted in March 2006 stressed the imperatives of an enhanced, broad-based social safety 
net (encompassing  not just social security but also rural health care and education) to 
improve income security, thereby reducing the excess precautionary saving that continue 
to inhibit the expansion of private consumption.  However, Chinese authorities have so 
far failed to put this policy into action, presumably because of the strong domestic 
political pressure to maintain the momentum of employment-intensive growth through 
export orientation (Yu 2007, Gan 2008).     
The success on the rebalancing front will naturally involve an appreciation of 
China’s real exchange rate
10, a reduction in profitability of tradable production relatively 
non-tradable production.  But this is unlikely to impede, at least over the medium term, 
China’s role as the premier assembly centre within regional production networks.   Even 
after three decades of rapid growth, the average hourly wage rate for the overall Chinese 
manufacturing ($3.2) is still (as at 2007) amounts to only 13% of the US hourly wage rate 
($24.4).
11  About half of China’s massive labour force (about 745 million) is still engaged 
in agriculture where productivity is, on average, barely one-eighth of that in industry and 
about a quarter of that in the service sector.  This, coupled with the high skilled-unskilled 
wage differential (which, according to some estimates, has risen from 1.3 to 2.1 over the 
past decade (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2006)) suggest that China still has much potential 
for moving unskilled workers out of agriculture and into manufacturing and other 
productive urban sector activities.
12
                                                  
10 Whether it would be preferable to achieve this by adjustments to nominal exchange rate than by 
adjustment to domestic prices remain a subject of controversy which is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
    
11 Data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics website (ftp.bls.gov) 
12 In recent years there have been many scattered cases of rising wages and worker shortages in 
industrial cities in China.  However, one cannot realistically infer this evidence as indicative of a 
broader macroeconomic trend of emerging labour shortages, given that the Chinese economy is  
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The pressure for maintaining export competition in a context of slow-growing 
world demand could provide a fertile setting for the rise of trade friction and 
protectionism (Bhagwati 1988, Erixon and Razeen 2009).  Fortunately, there has not yet 
been a protectionist backlash in the form of erecting tariff walls as happened during the 
Great Depression.  However, there are already signs of countries increasingly resorting to 
disguise (or just disguising) means of protection such as filing anti-dumping complains 
and  imposing  stringent implementation of technical and sanitary and phytosanitary 
standards, in addition to the massive financial support extended by the USA and some 
other countries to automobile manufacturers (Gamberoni and Newfarmer 2009). The 
number of legislative measured introduced in the US Congress which involve some forms 
of sanction on China trade have multiplied in recent years (Roach 2009, p. 241).  There is 
therefore a strong case for devising strategies to fight new protectionism as part of a long 
term commitment to non-discriminatory multilateral and unilateral liberalisation. The 
Information Technology Agreement which came into force in 1997 seems to be a 
promising example to follow (Elek 2008).  There is also a case for Asia’s G20 countries 
and the ASEAN Secretariat to consolidate their positions against protectionist tendencies.   
As part of its attempt to keep export markets open, China should not resist the temptation 
to use export subsidies and other selective policies to support its export sector. In an era 
of rising unemployment and the resultant backlash against globalisation in the US and 
other developed countries, such efforts could be a recipe for anti-china trade sanctions. 
One option under consideration in Asian policy circles for supporting regional 
trade growth in face of slow growth in world demand is  to  form  region-wide FTA, 
encompassing ASEAN, China, Japan and Korea (and possibly India) (Kawai and 
Wignaraja 2009, ADB 2009).  The logic behind this proposal in relation to the net work 
trade in the region is the following: Trade within global production networks (both in 
components and final assembly) is generally more sensitive to tariff changes than is final 
trade (or total trade as captured in published trade data) (Yi 2003). Normally a tariff is 
incurred each time a good-in-process crosses a border. Consequently, a one percentage 
point reduction in tariff leads to a decline in the cost of production of a vertically 
                                                                                                                                                      
still a long way away from having a fully functioning labour market.  These cases could well 
reflect skill mismatches and frictional dislocations in a highly imperfect labour market rather than 
genuine labour shortages.  
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integrated good by a multiple of this initial reduction, in contrast to a one per cent decline 
in the cost of a regular traded good. Tariff reductions may also make it more profitable for 
goods that were previously produced entirely in one country to become vertically 
specialized. Consequently, in theory, the trade-stimulating effect of FTAs would be higher 
for network trade than for normal trade, other things remaining unchanged.  
In our view this is a risky strategy, given Asia’s heavy reliance on extra regional 
markets for its export dynamism. Such a move would invite swift retaliation by the US 
and EU.  A firm commitment as part of the FTA to not to increase existing tariff and non-tariff 
barriers against non-member is unlikely to avert this threat because an Asia-wide FTA, given that 
it encompasses a number of significant world trading nations, is likely to involve significant trade 
diversion even under the existing extra-regional tariffs.  In any case, the chances of 
negotiating a region-wide FTA look rather slim in the context of the on-going crisis.  In 
particular, China may not want to get involved in such an endeavor not only because of 
its new emphasis on domestic-oriented growth but also because of its official 
commitment to averting protectionist backlashes  against its exports from developed 
countries.
13 Governments in Southeast Asian countries are also concerned that any region 
wide attempt to liberalise trade would give unfair advantage to China in attracting FDI 
involved in global production networks, given its vast domestic economy characterized 
by regional differences in cost of production.
14
In reality, the trade effects of any FTA would depend very much on the nature of 
the rules of origin (ROO) built into it.   In particular, there are three main complications 
involved in bringing network trade under FTAs (or other preferential trading 
arrangements).  First, formulating ROOs for network-related trade is rather complicated 
business. The conventional value-added criterion is not virtually applicable to this trade 
because the products involved are low-value added by their very nature.  The only viable 
option is to go for  ‘change in tariff lines’-based ROOs, but this leads to insurmountable 
administrative problems because trade in electrical and electronics goods and the related 
parts and components belong to the same tariff codes at the HS-6 digit level, which is the 
  
                                                  
13 See for instance the recent article wrote by the Chinese Minister of Trade to the Wall Street 
Journal ( Demin 2009) 
14 This point is based on interviews with high-ranking officials at the Thai Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.  
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normal base for designing this type of ROOs (Kohpaiboon 2009: Appendix 2). For 
example, electrical appliances assembly plants is Thailand which use imported bare 
printed circuit board (BPCB) together with other locally procured electronic components 
(e.g. diode, integrated circuits, semi-conductors) to printed circuit board assembly 
(PCBA) for export are not eligible to FTA concessions because BPCBs and PCBAs 
belong to the same HS code 853690 .     
Second, the process of international production fragmentation and the network-
based international production is characterised by the continuous emergence of ‘new’ 
products. Given the obvious administrative problems involved in revising ROOs in 
tandem, these product inventions and innovations  naturally  opens up room for 
unnecessary administrative delays and/or tweaking of rules as a means of disguised 
protection (Elek 2008).  Moreover, given the importance of extra-regional markets for 
final goods for the growth dynamism of production networks in Asia, maintaining 
barriers to trade against non-members (while allowing free trade among members) can 
thwart ‘natural’ expansion of global production sharing.  Third, twisting ROOs for the 
purpose of import-competing industries becomes  easier when the production process 
involves procuring parts and components from a number of sources: tightening ROOs on 
the procurement of one critical input would suffice to protect competing domestic 
producers of the final (assembled) product.
15
  
  
Finally, it is important to note that, the available evidence on the operation of 
FTAs in operation in the region (and beyond) augur well for the potency of a new region-
wide FTA.  Presumably because of the operational complications noted above, the actual 
utilization rates of tariff concessions provided under these FTAs are rather low, ranging 
from about 5 percent to 20 percent across different product categories (Takahasgi and 
Urata 2008, Kawai and Wignaraja 2009, Kohpaiboon 2008).  More importantly, there is 
                                                  
15  ROOs relating to TV sets (HS852812) in the Thailand-Australia Free Trade Agreements 
(Annex 4.1) can be used to illustrate this point.  To become eligible for preferential tariffs, TV 
producers must source three parts (HS701120, 854011, and 854091) locally.  But TV Picture 
Tubes (HS854011) are not produced in Thailand and Thai color TV assembly is viable if an only 
this item is procured from Japan, Taiwan, or Korea. Thus, even though preferential tariff on TV 
under the FTA (20 percent) is very attractive, Thailand-Australia FTA is virtually irrelevant for 
TV assembly plants located in Thailand.       
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evidence that the utilization rates are often firm/industry specific: Normally Large firms 
and firms with close trade and FDI ties or those located in particular industries where 
meeting ROO requirements are simple and straightforward use FTAs.  The upshot is that 
FTAs are unlikely to have the potential to promote trade in a neutral and broad-based 
fashion.    
     
Conclusions 
Intra-regional trade shares based on conventional trade data are generally consistent with 
the view that East Asia has become increasingly integrated through merchandise trade.  
However, when the on-going process of international production fragmentation and East 
Asia’s unique role in China-centered global production networks are appropriately taken 
into account, it is clearly evident that, the increase over time in intraregional trade ratios 
has emanated largely from the  rapid increase in intra-regional imports, while intra-
regional export expansion has persistently  lagged behind.  The asymmetry in intra-
regional shares between imports and exports is much sharper when reported trade data are 
adjusted for trade in parts and components. Clearly, the region’s dependence of the rest of 
the world for its trade expansion has in fact increased over the time. 
This inference is basically consistent with the behaviour of trade flows following 
the onset of the global financial crisis.  The remarkably synchronised nature of the trade 
contraction across countries in the region is generally consistent with the close trade ties 
within East Asian, forged within regional production networks.  While many had hoped 
that China would provide a cushion for this export contraction─as would have been 
consistent with the decoupling thesis─this did not turn out to be the case.  
The rise of global production sharing has strengthened the case for a global, 
rather than a regional, approach to trade policymaking. Given the global orientation 
of the region’s economies, we question whether there would be any significant 
positive pay-off from forming a region-wide FTA.  It is doubtful whether FTA approach 
to trade liberalization is feasible in a context where global production networks are 
rapidly expanding, seamlessly encompassing many industries and countries.  
The recent and prospective developments in the global economy following the 
global financial crisis make a strong case for China to go ahead with the  speedy  
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implementation of the growth-rebalancing policy embodied it the 11th Five Year Plan.  
Given the nature of domestic factor market conditions and the on-going changes in the 
process of global production sharing, promoting domestic demand-oriented growth and 
engagement in global production sharing are not mutually exclusive policy priorities for 
China  over the medium term.  Successful growth  rebalancing  has the potential to 
facilitate  the further expansion of network trade by averting trade friction  with  and 
retaliation  from the US and other major trading-partner countries.    An enlarged 
domestic market would also have potential to improve international competitiveness of 
exporting firms within production networks by reducing unit cost of production.  Looking 
further ahead, increase in domestic income and wages under a successful balanced 
growth strategy would provide the setting for china to move up the value ladder within 
global production networks.  After all, the bulk (more than 60 per cent) of international 
exchange within global production networks takes place among developed countries and, 
in the future, China has the potential to become one of them.  
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Table 1:  Composition of Manufacturing Exports1, 2006/7 ( percent) 
Commodity group2  EA  Japan  DEA  China  TW+K  ASEAN  NAFTA  EU15  World 
Chemicals (SITC 5)  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Resource based products  (SITC 6  - SITC 68)  1.2  1.8  0.9  1.0  1.0  0.7  2.1  2.8  2.0 
Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7)  89.7  87.5  90.3  91.6  84.0  94.7  86.0  87.9  88.1 
     Power generating machines (SITC 71)  1.8  3.8  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.2  9.0  6.6  4.9 
     Specialized industrial machine  (SITC 72)  2.1  3.5  1.7  1.8  1.1  2.3  2.6  3.5  2.7 
     Metal working machine (SITC 73)  0.3  0.6  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.4  0.7  0.5 
     General industrial machinery (SITC 74)  1.3  1.7  1.2  1.4  0.9  1.2  2.4  3.5  2.3 
ICT products  60.5  33.2  68.9  69.2  59.7  78.3  27.6  22.9  41.1 
    Office/ automatic data processing machines (SITC 75)  19.6  8.2  23.1  29.0  8.7  27.0  7.2  7.6  12.4 
    Telecommunication and sound recording equipment (SITC 76)  18.7  9.0  21.7  28.3  16.1  14.9  9.6  7.9  13.1 
          Semiconductors and semiconductor devices (SITC772+776)  22.2  16.0  24.2  11.8  34.9  36.4  10.8  7.5  15.7 
Electrical goods (SITC 77 - 772 - 776)  9.7  8.1  10.2  14.2  6.1  6.4  8.2  8.5  9.3 
      Road vehicles (SITC 78)  12.7  35.0  5.9  3.2  12.6  4.4  26.5  36.4  23.0 
      Other transport equipment (SITC 79)  1.3  1.6  1.2  0.7  2.3  0.9  9.3  5.7  4.4 
Miscellaneous manufacturing (SITC 8)  9.1  10.6  8.7  7.3  14.9  4.6  11.8  9.1  9.8 
Professional and scientific equipment (SITC 87)  5.5  5.8  5.4  4.0  11.0  2.6  8.2  5.9  6.3 
Photographic apparatus (SITC 88)  2.3  3.6  1.9  2.4  1.2  1.3  1.3  1.8  2.1 
Total manufacturing exports  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
US$ billion  1826  428  1398  656  359  348  739  1366  4517 
Note:      
(1)  Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) codes are given in brackets.  
(2)  EA:  East Asia,   DEA:  Developing East Asia,  TW+K:  Taiwan and Korea;  ASEAN6:   Six main ASEAN countries;   EU15: 15 member countries of 
the European Union;  NAFTA:  countries in the North American Free Trade Agreement (USA, Canada and Mexico)                                       
  
Source: Compiled from UN Comtrade database 
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Table 2: Share of Parts and Components in Manufacturing Trade, 1992/3 and 2006/7 ( 
percent) 
                Exports            Imports 
  1992/3  2006/7  1992/3  2006/7 
East Asia   20.2  34.1  27.2  42.1 
   Japan  23.9  34.4  19.3  29.9 
Developing East Asia  17.3  34  29  44.2 
      China (PRC)  7.4  25.6  20.4  44 
   Hong Kong, China  15.8  33.3  24.1  48.5 
   Taiwan  24.7  44.2  29.5  38.9 
      Republic of Korea  18.1  47.3  30.1  31.9 
   ASEAN   22.7  44.2  36  47.9 
       Indonesia  3.8  21.5  27  21.8 
       Malaysia  27.7  53.6  40.5  50 
       Philippines  32.9  71.7  32.6  61.3 
       Singapore  29  49.3  39.9  60.4 
       Thailand  14.1  29.9  30.6  36.1 
       Vietnam  ---  11.0  ---  19.1 
South Asia   2.3  8.2  16.6  23.8 
    India  3  10.4  17.5  22.9 
NAFTA  28.4  31.2  37.4  28.8 
   Mexico  42.1  34.6  29.4  36.1 
EU15  18.3  22.4  21.2  23.2 
Developed countries  20.4  25.2  22.6  23.4 
Developing countries   14.6  29.2  11.9  33.6 
World  19.3  27.1  19.6  27.3 
Note:     …  Data not available                                        
 Source: Compiled from UN Comtrade database 
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Table 3: Share of parts and components in bilateral trade flows, 2006/7 ( percent) 
Reporting country  EA  Japan  DEA  PRC  ASEAN  NAFTA  EU15  World 
 
(a) Exports  
               
East Asia (EA)  47.6  32.9  50.1  51.6  54.5  25.1  24.1  34.1 
  Japan  42.0  0.0  42.0  41.5  47.9  31.5  30.4  34.4 
Developing East Asia (DEA)  48.1  33.4  53.9  0.0  65.2  22.7  21.6  34.0 
    China (PRC)  36.2  25.2  40.6  0.0  49.1  17.1  16.3  25.6 
   Korea  61.9  51.5  63.5  57.3  63.7  36.6  26.8  44.2 
   Taiwan  51.5  59.0  50.5  39.5  61.2  35.0  37.6  44.2 
   ASEAN10  58.2  39.9  61.4  64.0  56.0  32.1  33.9  44.2 
NAFTA  46.7  36.5  49.8  34.8  67.9  28.8  30.6  31.2 
EU15  31.4  18.7  34.8  30.4  46.5  22.1  22.0  22.4 
 
(b) Imports 
               
East Asia (EA)  51.7  48.8  52.8  34.8  68.3  54.7  33.1  42.1 
  Japan  34.2  0.0  34.2  23.1  44.9  41.0  18.9  29.9 
Developing East Asia (DEA)  55.5  47.7  59.5  0.0  74.3  40.3  31.7  44.2 
    China (PRC)  55.2  47.5  59.2  0.0  74.0  40.1  31.6  44.0 
    Korea  33.0  26.6  38.1  26.1  55.7  38.9  22.9  31.9 
     Taiwan  46.7  33.8  58.3  44.1  68.8  40.2  28.0  38.9 
    ASEAN10  50.3  47.2  51.4  40.1  55.9  67.5  41.7  47.9 
NAFTA  29.4  39.3  26.0  17.7  40.5  36.3  25.1  28.8 
EU15  25.0  33.6  22.8  14.9  37.9  34.1  22.1  23.4 
Note:      
1.  EA:  East Asia,   DEA:  Developing East Asia;  ASEAN6:   six main ASEAN countries;   
EU15: 15 member countries of the European Union;  NAFTA:  countries in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (USA, Canada and Mexico)                                       
 
Source: Compiled from UN Comtrade database. 
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Table 4:  China’s trade with rest of East Asia ( percent) 
            Exports         Imports 
A:  Commodity composition  1994-5  2006-7  1994-5  2006-7 
A:1:  Total trade  100  100  100  100 
Primary products  16.2  10.4  23.5  13.5 
Manufacturing  83.4  89.2  76.1  86.3 
    Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7)  20.8  46.6  26.4  49.7 
     Electronics and electrical goods  (75+76+77)  16.7  40.6  15.0  43.0 
     Miscellaneous manufacturing (SITC 8)  43.3  25.5  7.7  12.5 
      Apparel (84)  18.5  10.3  1.3  0.4 
A2:   Parts and components  100  100  100  100 
Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7)  90.2  95.5  92.1  95.1 
Electronic and electrical goods (75+76+77)  81.0  87.7  74.6  85.7 
Transport equipment (78)  3.7  2.3  0.7  1.8 
  Other  9.8  4.5  3.8  3.3 
B:  Parts and component share in manufacturing  trade         
Total manufacturing  7.5  25.6  17.9  44.4 
Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7)  6.8  24.4  46.1  73.3 
    Electronic and electrical goods (75+76+77)  30.3  49.3  73.1  82.5 
    Transport equipment  25.4  50.1  16.3  79.0 
Other   1.4  4.0  18.0  14.4 
C:  Trade with East Asia in China's world  trade         
C.1:  Total trade   55.8  33.7  21.3  28.4 
Primary products  74.6  59.2  27.9  15.5 
Manufacturing  53.3  32.2  19.9  32.7 
     Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7)  53.7  33.1  13.4  32.0 
     Electronic and electrical goods (75+76+77)  60.4  34.6  53.0  52.0 
     Miscellaneous manufacturing (SITC 8)  50.1  29.1  27.2  36.0 
     Apparel (84)  59.1  38.1  45.1  52.9 
C2:  Parts and component   60.1  44.7  22.4  38.7 
Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7)  59.8  44.6  21.7  38.6 
    Electronic and electrical goods (75+76+77)  61.2  46.0  68.9  56.2 
    Transport equipment  44.2  23.2  5.6  21.7 
Miscellaneous manufacturing (SITC 8)  62.2  45.7  30.3  40.7 
Note:   1.  East Asia:  Developing East Asia and  Japan      
Source:  Compiled from UN Comtrade database. 
 
    
 
25 
 
Table  5: East Asia – China manufacturing trade 
 
  A: Geographic profile 
of China’s imports 
B:  Exports to China 
relative to total exports 
by country/region 
  1994/5  2006/7  1994/5  2006/7 
East Asia  58.2  58.6  7.6  21.2 
    Japan  20.9  16.4  5.5  17.3 
Developing East Asia  37.1  42.2  8.2  21.6 
   Hong Kong  17.3  2.0  29.6  19.5 
   Korea  4.3  13.4  5.8  27.2 
   Taiwan  10.7  14.0  10.3  32.6 
   ASEAN  3.7  13.8  2.5  13.7 
      Indonesia  1.0  1.1  3.3  8.4 
      Malaysia  1.1  3.4  3.2  13.5 
      Philippines  0.2  2.1  1.5  21.3 
      Singapore  0.8  2.3  1.8  12.2 
      Thailand  0.7  2.3  1.8  11.2 
      Vietnam  0.1  0.1  2.5  4.1 
Other countries  41.8  41.4  1.5  3.7 
World   100  100  2.7  6.7 
 
Source:  Compiled from UN Comtrade database, and  Trade Data CD-ROM,  
Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taipei (for data on Taiwan)    
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Table 6:  Intra-regional shares of Manufacturing Trade: Total, Parts and Components, and Final 
Trade ( percent), 1992/3 and 2006/07
1 
  East Asia 
 
Developing 
East Asia 
ASEAN +3
2 
 
ASEAN  NAFTA  EU15 
(a)  Total trade             
Exports             
   1986/7  28.4  25.1  17.3  17.4  49.1  65.5 
   1992/3  47.2  38.2  15.3  20.7  44.4  61.2 
   2006/7  43.9  33.4  21.9  18.4  48.1  56.9 
Imports             
  1986/7  48.6  22.9  34.4  11.0  29.9  69.7 
   1992/3  58.2  34.9  43.0  15.5  36.3  64.1 
   2006/7  64.4  46.7  49.3  20.8  32.o  57.9 
Trade 
 (exports + imports) 
           
  1986/7  35.8  24.0  22.9  13.5  37.1  67.5 
   1992/3  53.2  36.5  27.0  17.8  39.9  62.6 
   2006/7  55.1  40.0  30.4  20.1  38.4  57.4 
(b)  Parts and  
components 
           
Exports             
   1992/3  50.2  42.6  33.7  30.3  43.5  62.3 
   2006/7  61.1  53.9  35.3  25.4  46.9  55.9 
Imports             
   1992/3  65.9  35.3  39.6  20.2  39.5  58.0 
   2006/7  66.9  50.9  47.8  22.9  39.9  55.2 
Trade             
   1992/3  57.0  38.7  35.4  24.2  41.4  60.1 
   2006/7  62.9  52.1  40.2  23.1  43.2  55.5 
( c)   Final goods 
2             
Exports             
   1992/3  46.0  36.8  11.4  16.1  44.7  60.9 
   2006/7  36.9  28.3  17.0  15.9  48.7  57.0 
Imports             
   1992/3  55.4  34.7  43.4  12.9  35.3  65.6 
   2006/7  63.0  42.8  50.2  20.6  30.2  58.5 
Trade             
   1992/3  50.3  35.7  25.4  14.3  39.4  63.2 
   2006/7  46.4  34.0  29.1  18.0  37.3  57.7 
Notes: 
1  Intra-regional trade shares have been calculated excluding bilateral  flows between China and 
Hong Kong. 
2  ASEAN +  Japan + Korea +China 
2   Total (reported) trade (a) – parts and components (b). 
Source:  Compiled from UN Comtrade database, and  Trade Data CD-ROM,  Council for Economic 
Planning and Development, Taipei (for data on Taiwan) 
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Table 7:  East Asia: Growth of total merchandise exports and imports, 2007Q1–2009Q3 
  (Year-on-year  percent change)
1  
  2008Q1  2008Q2  2008Q3  2008Q4  2009Q1  2009Q2  2009Q3     
Exports                   
East Asia (EA)  20.6  21.0  19.3  -5.6  -30.1  -32.5  -30.2     
    Japan   22.9  16.4  15.2  -8.1  -42.1  -41.1  -38.2     
Developing EA  19.0  21.3  19.9  -4.7  -26.6  -27.2  -24.2     
    HK  10.5  8.3  5.7  -2.1  -21.0  -23.4  -20.1     
    China  21.1  22.4  23.0  4.6  -20.1  -22.7  -20.3     
    Korea   17.4  23.2  27.1  -9.9  -24.5  -20.1  -20.3     
    Taiwan  17.4  18.2  7.6  -24.6  -35.9  -28.3  -18.5     
    ASEAN  18.9  26.9  22.9  -10.3  -36.8  -39.3  34.2     
       Indonesia   31.9  29.4  27.9  -5.3  -32.5  -33.2  31.1     
       Malaysia   19.4  28.5  21.6  -12.6  -27.6  -28.2  3.8     
       Philippines   -2.0  -0.6  2.0  -22.3  -33.9  -36.3  -37.2     
       Singapore   21.7  26.4  21.2  -12.9  -30.7  -31.2  -33.2     
       Thailand   25.5  25.5  27.2  -10.2  -23.0  -24.4  -26.3     
       Viet Nam   27.7  31.8  37.5  6.0  -14.8  -11.7  -7.3     
 
Imports 
                 
East Asia (EA)  29.6  29  29.8  -4.1  -32.5  -33.1  30.7     
    Japan   25.6  26.8  35.8  8.3  -29.0  -28.5  -28.1     
Developing EA  29  28.9  26.6  -8.0  -32.1  -34.2  -33.2     
    Hong Kong  12.0  9.6  7.0  -4.0  -20.8  -22.3  -25.2     
    China  29.4  32.9  25.9  -8.0  -30.8  -31.7  -30.3     
    Korea   29.0  30.5  42.9  -8.8  -32.8  -35.6  -11.9     
    Taiwan   26.1  19.2  20.3  -21.9  -45.9  -46.3  -47.2     
    ASEAN  37.9  36.2  32.6  -5.0  -37.2  -36.7  -35.3     
        Indonesia   91.6  96.1  82.3  33.3  -35.9  -36.2  -34.2     
        Malaysia   16.1  17.3  14.5  -17.1  -36.8  -36.1  4.8     
        Philippines   22.1  8.4  4.5  -23.4  -30.3  -31.3  -32.1     
        Singapore   32.1  35.4  32.9  -9.3  -30.0  -28.1  -29.2     
        Thailand   39.6  25.7  37.8  3.8  -39.7  -40.5  -37.3     
        Vietnam   69.0  61.0  22.8  -8.2  -36.5  -34.1  -31.1     
1  Growth rates calculated using current US$ values.                  Source: Compiled from CIEM database  
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Table 8:  China:   Growth of  total merchandise exports and imports by trading partner 
countries, 2007Q1 – 2009Q4 (Year-on-year parentage change, current US$ )  
  2008Q1  2008Q2  2008Q3  2008Q4  2009Q1  2009Q2  2009Q3  2009Q42 
(a) Exports                 
East Asia (EA)  23.7  25.1  28.2  4.5  -23.4  -24.2  -18.0  8.2 
   Japan  12.1  18.0  18.1  7.9  -16.7  -23.8  -16.3  -6.7 
Developing EA  31.2  29.2  33.9  2.7  -24.1  -24.5  -28.7  7.5 
   Korea  33.1  38.3  52.9  7.5  -29.2  -36.6  -35.0  -3.0 
   Taiwan  15.4  21.1  17.3  -10.4  -34.5  -38.8  -21.4  20.1 
   Hong Kong, China  10.8  6.5  11.0  -9.9  -24.0  -21.6  -16.6  12.2 
   ASEAN  34.2  26.0  27.4  2.8  -22.6  -16.8  -9.6  23.0 
      Indonesia  33.2  41.5  54.8  20.2  -26.4  -21.0  -24.0  21.3 
      Malaysia  33.3  28.2  20.8  7.1  -23.9  -12.2  -9.1  9.2 
      Philippines  30.4  22.8  34.5  1.3  -11.8  -18.7  -8.5  18.6 
      Singapore  15.3  5.9  17.1  -0.6  -17.1  -12.3  -16.2  21.4 
      Thailand  37.2  42.1  38.3  5.9  -27.3  -29.6  -14.3  21.1 
       Vietnam  88.8  45.1  16.0  -11.1  -30.0  -15.9  36.3  58.9 
USA  5.4  12.2  15.3  0.7  -15.4  -18.5  -16.7  1.4 
EU  25.0  29.7  23.5  4.1  -22.6  -26.6  -23.6  -4.2 
Total export  16.3  19.0  20.2  0.9  -21.1  -23.5  -20.3  7.2 
 
(b) Imports 
               
East Asia  18.8  24.1  13.2  -18.1  -33.7  -23.1  -12.5  30.2 
   Japan  17.0  23.7  18.7  -5.0  -29.8  -21.4  -13.4  15.6 
Developing  EA  19.6  24.3  10.8  -23.6  -35.3  -23.8  -12.1  37.7 
   Korea  14.9  25.0  14.8  -18.5  -26.6  -18.8  -10.2  33.6 
   Taiwan  24.5  24.2  5.0  -33.3  -43.9  -29.9  -14.9  43.8 
   Hong Kong  26.0  -2.5  11.0  -21.4  -49.1  -32.9  -33.3  -7.7 
   ASEAN  19.9  23.8  12.7  -18.9  -33.8  -22.1  -8.9  12.2 
      Indonesia  31.7  30.3  17.3  -13.5  -38.0  -18.4  -6.3  69.6 
      Malaysia  18.4  29.5  22.4  -16.1  -25.0  -17.0  -3.5  60.3 
      Philippines  12.7  5.7  -23.2  -48.6  -61.3  -51.7  -30.3  17.6 
      Singapore  6.7  35.5  27.4  -9.3  -23.7  -28.2  -11.9  27.2 
      Thailand  26.0  22.9  15.8  -5.6  -29.2  -6.6  -0.9  29.7 
      Vietnam  64.3  19.0  69.4  6.8  -7.9  23.6  -8.3  47.7 
USA  29.7  23.0  15.7  3.7  -17.7  -13.1  -6.4  19.3 
EU  25.9  33.0  22.7  2.3  -14.7  -11.2  -2.2  14.9 
Total imports   21.2  25.0  15.1  -12.2  -28.3  -19.6  -11.9  10.2 
1  Growth rates calculated using current US$ values. 
2  Average for October and November. 
Source: Compiled from CIEM database  
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Table 9: China: Growth of merchandise exports and imports by commodity category, 2008Q1– 2009Q3  
 (Year-on-year  percent change, current US$)  
  2008Q1  2008Q2  2008Q3  2008Q4  2009Q1  2009Q2   2009Q3 
(a)  Exports                     
Total exports  16.3  19.0  20.2  0.9  -21.1  -23.5  -20.3 
Primary  16.3  24.9  29.9  8.6  -17.9  -13.6  -14.2 
Manufacturing  21.2  23.8  22.0  2.6  -20.7  -18.2  -17.2 
    Products of the Chemical or Allied Industries  48.5  54.0  42.2  3.1  -25.2  -24.9  -23.4 
    Plastics and Articles thereof, Rubber and Articles  13.8  10.1  16.1  10.7  -21.1  -17.1  -17.3 
    Textiles and Textile Articles  22.5  5.3  4.1  8.0  -11.4  2.6  4.2 
    Footwear, Headgear, Umbrellas, etc  14.7  14.4  19.7  21.3  -1.3  7.2  8.2 
    Base Metals & Articles Of Base Metal  23.3  18.5  26.4  22.0  -9.0  -1.5  -4.3 
    Machinery and Mechanical Appliances, etc (ME)  15.9  -15.7  20.9  4.3  -31.6  -38.8  -42.1 
        Electronics  6.2  12.5  61.5  17.2  -33.5  -36.5  -37.3 
        Electrical Machinery and Equipment  20.3  27.0  20.4  -1.1  -21.5  -19.5  -20.2 
   Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles  41.5  39.0  31.7  9.1  -17.0  -19.7  -6.2 
(b) Imports                     
  2008Q1  2008Q2  2008Q3  2008Q4  2009Q1  2009Q2  2009Q3 
Total imports  21.2  25.0  15.1  -12.2  -28.3  -19.6  -11.9 
Primary  73.5  74.9  72.5  5.2  -40.7  -35.3  -27.2 
Manufacturing  16.3  19.1  11.4  -12.1  -26.2  -21.1  -19.2 
    Products of the Chemical or Allied Industries  19.6  23.5  19.6  -10.5  -23.9  -18.2  -16.3 
    Plastics and Articles thereof, Rubber and Articles  16.3  22.5  22.7  -15.6  -29.2  -20.1  15.2 
    Textiles and Textile Articles  6.3  2.7  -3.4  -9.2  -22.8  -22.8  -23.2 
    Footwear, Headgear, Umbrellas, etc  47.5  47.7  24.8  12.6  -2.8  -18.7  -22.2 
    Base Metals & Articles Of Base Metal  14.1  5.8  8.3  -15.0  -26.3  -16.9  -2.7 
    Machinery and Mechanical Appliances, etc (ME)  11.7  18.0  9.8  -10.7  -24.1  -17.9  -8.2 
       Electronics  16.3  19.9  15.0  -1.0  -19.8  -19.5  -3.2 
       Electrical Machinery and Equipment  9.5  17.1  7.4  -15.2  -26.3  -17.4  -6.7 
 Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles  11.6  20.8  1.4  -8.1  -5.4  1.6  2.2 
Source: Compiled from CEIM database.  
Figure 1: Growth of merchandise trade: East Asia, Developing East Asia, China 
and ASEAN, Jan. 2008 –  Nov 2009 (Y-O-Y,  percent)    
 
 
 
(a)   Exports 
 
(b)  Imports 
 
 
Source: Based on data compiled from CEIM database. 
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